I. INTRODUCTION
Software Defined Network (SDN) and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) frameworks [3] have been creating paradigm shifts across industries. In recent years, these two novel frameworks attracted interests throughout many academic institutions and communities of practice.
They may be considered disruptive to major network infrastructures operating on status quo, but SDN and NFV offer network resiliency, manageability, and, most importantly, affordances -lowering long-term operational expenditures when implemented properly. They create opportunities for innovation that result from providing platforms where key players from networks, security, and software groups develop new controllers, APIs, networks, and technologies. However, new innovations come with associated risks and security issues.
A. SDN
In 2012, it was widely speculated that Google implemented SDN and OpenFlow into their networks, and created their own OpenFlow-enabled switches due to the limited vendors supporting this protocol. This speculation and clear benefits of deploying SDN and OpenFlow have since gained significant interests across many industries.
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To understand SDN is to review the OSI layer, where concepts of abstraction and separation, are similar to tiering and layering, which determined by the layers of the stack.
In SDN, control and data planes are separated, centralizing the control and programmability of the network. To connect applications across the upper and lower planes, Application Program Interfaces (APIs), which a few were successfully standardized (eg. OpenFlow) are utilized.
The components of the SDN framework are composed of Northbound and Southbound APIs.
Northbound APIs achieve abstraction to the top of the framework while the Southbound APIs achieve the same at the bottom of the framework.
Additionally, East and Westbound APIs, which are formally introduced in the IETF draft [3] , are used for horizontal communications across devices, systems, or software on a given plane.
Summarily, the Northbound and Southbound APIs are used for vertical connections, while the East and Westbound APIs are for horizontal connections. Notably, the application tier /plane can host a variety of business applications and application-based security systems.
The Application plane normally composes of application driven engines. The control plane on the other hand, composes controllers or orchestrators, where routing and security policies are implemented. The data plane is basically the infrastructures composing network devices, such as routers, switches, and security devices. Each plane can be virtualized as and when needed.
Initially, the implementations of SDN targeted campuses, Data Centres and Cloud, but eventually expanded to other areas and adapted by service and network providers.
B. NFV
NFV was formalized in 2012. Its goal is to relocate network functions from dedicated hardware appliances to generic servers. It is initially intended for routers, firewalls, and gateways, but can be expanded to include load balancers and other intermediary devices [3] .
Unlike SDN, NFV does not have a specific protocol. However, both SDN and NFV create open innovation by third parties, reducing capital and operational expenditures.
C. Security Architecture
A formal security architecture (SN-SECA) that overarches important aspects of SDN and NFV's frameworks was proposed to aid practitioners integrate security in their SDN/NVF designs and implementations. This architecture, which is considered first to be proposed through IETF draft [3] , can be elaborated and modified as the frameworks mature over time.
SN-SECA was developed based on general practices (usecases [22, 24] ) on traditional networks across different industries. It is presented with supplemental information on the attributes, which can provide a basis for basic, if not comprehensive security profile for each plane within SDN and NFV. Essentially, the idea is to use a common baseline design that, on one hand, provides a sufficient level of protection of systems and devices within the plane, but which, on the other hand, is deemed practical and deployable to infrastructures that operate on SDN and NFV.
D. Contributions
The following contributions to the analysis of the proposed SN-SEC are presented.
• The formalization of SN-SECA for inductive analysis and automata of its security attributes by proving connections between selected trace properties of implementation and non-selected theoretic properties standard in the literature; • Introduction of a type of retrofit: a revision and replication. This type of retrofit implies changes to planes of the architecture which must be articulated for a validity requirement to be constructed and evaluated. As is true in architecture design, the paper highlights a method, which traces the (TP) flow that does not limit validation scenarios surrounding the intended effect of the architecture to specific implementations.
• Security validity to support SDN /NFV implementations.
II. ORGANIZATION
Firstly, the paper presents the architecture that published recently as an IETF informational draft [3] . Secondly, it describes selected methods of analyses, and how these are employed to review the architecture design. Then lastly, it describes and illustrates the layers of validating the architecture and its design; and discusses the concept of architectural retrofit, which is the process of altering the architecture after it has been put into operational use.
III. ARCHITECTURE
The development of the architecture was based on the usecases of traditional security implementations across many industries. We use use-cases [22, 24] on SDN/NFV, which are limited at this stage.
The industries discussed in this work, are not limited to academe, financial, government, manufacturing, retail and telecommunications, where specific infrastructures and business requirements certainly vary depending on their existing networks and on their maturity to achieve a consolidated security overview of infrastructures to form an architecture that is generalizable to most community of practices.
Attributes of the proposed architecture are composed of APPS -Applications, Northbound APIs, Application Tier, Extensive Validation, East and Westbound APIs, Control Plane, Data Plane, SDN Controller, Open Flow enabled devices, Governance and Frameworks, other virtual and physical devices, and Best practices. The Northbound APIs can be implemented for applications to work with SDN controller, thus in absence of existing standards, an external validation is necessary. On the SDN control plane, various attributes can be introduced, provided they enforce security policies through OpenFlow to the virtual devices. SDN controllers utilized as orchestrators and unified management systems can enforce security to other devices through other Southbound APIs.
The link between the controller and the remaining plane can be protected using IPSec (securing end-to-end), TLS or HTTPS. Other intermediary security devices, such as IPS/IDS, can be deployed across the planes.
The following are the risks identified on SDN/NFV based on the traditional network designs.
a. Adversarial traffic flows -traffic passing through network devices, interfaces, and hosts. These attributes (see figure 2) are introduced in the SN-SECA. They are inclusive of the security mitigations that must be considered in specific network implementations.
IV. APPROACH
In the succeeding sections, the approach and methods of analyses presented were tested and employed in other security architecture [4] . Thus follow the same logic with different variables for SN-SECA. There are various possibilities to describe how the TP flow passes through the attributes. The flow, however, only relies on the given flow source. To distinguish which attributes is used, they are presented as words over {a,b} and a constant # (1,2..n). We limit our representation of data as TP flow, flowsource, flow-destination, and # to specific attributes we proposed.
A. Traffic and Process (TP) Flow

Example 1.
For example the term t=ab(#). # identifies as an attribute, example ab(1) is assigned to a specific attribute j. This representation allows us to build a tree automata recognizing TP flow and attributes to analyze the architecture as a state.
Data are terms of sort TP flow for example, the term TP flow (from(ab,x),dest(ab,x)) represents a TP flow (from(ab(1),x),dest(ab(1),x')) to the set of data whose flowsource comes from a security attribute ab# and flowdestination exits to the same attribute is a given flow.
In the preceding section , we define how the flow can be analyzed across ab(#) attributes (using the symbols flowsource and flow-destination) thus allows us to encode and assume a symbolic attack by appropriate tree automata [15] , which we use for the analysis.
B. Architecture Traffic Flow
Furthermore, to represent the TP flow in the proposed architecture, we add the following symbols.
Enter or accept, Exit or reject : AE Decision
From a rewriting point of view, the flow rewrites a TP flow into enter, exit or reject. However, the security attributes (j…u) do not necessarily reject each other, if and when one of them do not exist (i.e.,caused by its absence or by an anomaly). Definition 1 (Attribute). An attribute is composed of three ordered rewrite systems Prem, Processm, and Exitm such that:
• flows of 
[m] = [m]accept U [m]exit OR [m] reject
With R:{xAEx} is the rewrite system R in which the flow xAEx has been added as the last flow.
From an abstract point of view, a attribute can be seen as a partial or total function which takes an input (data / TP flow) and returns either exit/reject.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE ARCHITECTURE
We show that this rewrite specification allows not only to automatically check properties concerning the semantics of a attribute as part of the overall architecture but also to perform structural and query analysis [1, [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] on the architecture itself.
A.Semantics Analysis
A attribute can be seen as a decision process which associates to TP flow with data that could be either accept or reject/exit, and therefore the following properties need verification: consistency, which indicates that at most, one decision is taken for a given TP flow; termination, [1-7-10-12,14,17,19-20] which ensures that an attribute computes a decision in a finite time; and completeness, [1, [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] which signifies that for any TP flow, the attribute returns a decision.
As discussed, by construction, any attribute that denotes a terminating and consistent decision process is a function. The completeness can be therefore defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Completeness).
We state that an attribute (m) as part of the whole architecture (a), is a complete iff [m] , which is a total function.
The particular shape of the flows defining a attribute allows us to represent the semantics of an attribute as a regular relation and to verify its completeness. In case of a complete architecture, yet selecting only the applicable attributes in either in isolation or in compositional groups, where these are used at the same time, but independently operate on a given speed, it is important to determine if the chosen attribute is applicably stronger than the others. This can be achieved, through verification, based on specifications of the attributes. For the same reasons, we can decide whether a attribute is more or less permissive than the other within the architecture. [m'] accept/enter is decidable. Note that two attributes may have the same semantics even if their flows are different. This is particularly interesting since it allows to simplify and optimize the flows of an attribute [4, [19] [20] and check if the succeeding attribute has the same semantics as the preceding one.
Definition 4 (Order
B. Structural Analysis
Structural analysis [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] refers to the detection of socalled anomalies in (the implementations of) attribute. We look at these anomalies as properties expressed as relationships between the flows of attributes within the proposed architecture. Examples of anomalies are superseding (a flow leads to decisions contradictory to decisions of prior flows [18] [19] [20] of prior attributes), redundancy (a flow can be removed without any impact to other attributes and TP flow), generalization (a flow matches a superset of the set of data matched by a prior flow with a different decision). We should mention that although several approaches have been developed for the detection of the above anomalies, they are often intentionally introduced in order to obtain more compact or more effective flow sets. Detecting anomalies is still interesting since it can outline some mitigation. We only discuss here our approach for detecting superseding; the other anomalies can be treated in a similar way. Let us recall the definition of the superseding anomaly [18] [19] [20] in this context: we say that a attribute superseding iff it contains at least one flow such that all TP flow it allows and accepts are dropped by a prior flow. In such a case, the concerned flow is said to be superseded.
The detection of the superseded flows, as well as of the other anomalies, is based on the regularity of the sets of terms associated to a given flow. More precisely, each flow r is associated to several sets: rec(r), denoting the set of data matching r; rec(r=Process m ), denoting the set of data matching r that match no S prior flow of Process m (i.e. rec(r)\ r'<r rec(r')) and rec(r=Process m [d] ) denoting the set of data matching r that match no other flow of Process m associated to the decision d. Since the left-hand sides of the processing flows are linear terms, all the sets rec(r) are regular; the other sets are also regular since they can be built starting from rec(r) and using operations which preserve regularity. Anomalies can then be detected using inclusion or emptiness tests. 
C. Query Analysis
Another kind of analysis we attempted is query analysis. This kind of analysis provides a way to assist researchers in understanding the behavior of an attribute within our architecture through deriving outputs based on pre-determined and pre-defined queries, such as "which attribute will receive the TP flowing from left to the right side of the architecture?" [3,7,6-9,11-16,19,20.] We introduced earlier the semantics of the attributes and the architecture as regular relation. The following therefore can be built on for any query expressed as first order formula [17] [18] [19] [20] :
• variables, ground terms or terms whose head is symbol data or TP flow and whose sub terms are variables of ground terms [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] .
• membership constraints w.r.t. to one of the relations defined in Definition 2 and [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] • membership constraints [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] 20] w.r.t, to a linear term.
All can be written into tree automaton [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 20 ] recognizing the set of solutions of the query, that is values of free variables verifying the formula as true [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] .
D. Retrofit
Retrofit allows continuous reviews and adjustments on the architecture after its implementations.
In this case, the complexity of the needed operations strongly depends on the representation of data and, in particular, on the representation of TP flow. The choice of TP flow as words over {a,b} (or equivalently as terms built from the monadic symbols a and b, and the constant #) is indeed made in order to obtain efficient implementations of the corresponding automata operations.
To simplify, consider the word automata: the correspondence with tree automata is straightforward. Due to the representation of ab(i…n) ranges, we are confronted with n-prefix (or simply prefix) languages, i.e. regular languages of the form or (a,b}*. A good property of the manipulated ranges is that corresponding minimal and deterministic automata have no loop except at their unique final state, which loops over itself for any word.
Moreover, the sets of TP flow of a given attribute are 1-prefix. It follows that rec(r), rec(r=Processm),…, are prefix languages. Consequently, anomalies can be efficiently detected using this approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
In verifying our proposed architecture, we use symbolic analysis of each attribute across the plane of TP flow.
We described the architecture using structural, semantics, and query analyses aside from using rewrite systems, which interpreted relevant properties through classical, theoretical and practical methods. We have shown that these approaches and analyses underscored any foreseen anomalies such as absence of the recommended attributes, or lack of secure traffic flow that require adequate processes, which can be utilized to assist in the implementation of selected attributes across the planes in the architecture.
Future work to survey better ways to understand and address security threats and vulnerabilities essential to enhance the proposed SDN/NFV security architecture is being explored.
